The latest geopolitical risk analysis as it’s published — every assessment backed by a claim-level evidence ledger, drawn from satellite, maritime, energy and open sources. Read the ten newest in full, free.
Very likely (75-90%) Ghana's proposal for a regional security grouping will receive formal responses from the Alliance of Sahel States and ECOWAS with
Very likely (70-85%), confidence: moderate, successive US CENTCOM strike waves inside Iran on 8-12 July 2026 and Iranian missile/drone reprisals have
Very likely (65-80%; moderate confidence) that reciprocal US-CENTCOM strikes (26-28 June) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maritime
Ghana's special envoy to the Alliance of Sahel States is finalising a proposal for a new regional security grouping to counter violent jihadism, seeking cooperation between ECOWAS states and the military-led governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The initiative represents the first concrete diplomatic effort to bridge the security coordination gap since the Alliance of Sahel States withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2024. Final leader responses are expected imminently.
The alleged nationwide protests and road blockades in Bolivia demanding President Rodrigo Paz's resignation are very likely unsubstantiated for the current period. Reporting describes isolated June 2026 road blockades resolved without significant violence, with repression claims contradicted by Bolivia's ombudsman institution and fact-checkers. The narrative appears to be a misattribution of outdated events amid competing global crises.
No new source material is available to assess airstrike activity in Ukraine for 6-7 August 2026. The situation remains as assessed in the prior brief dated 17 July 2026, but without confirmation of any new developments. Overall confidence in the current assessment is insufficient due to absence of corroborating sources.
China Coast Guard used water cannon against vessels near Scarborough Shoal on 30 July, confirming prior expectations of near-term friction. The Philippines has not yet issued an official response, indicating possible internal deliberation. Tensions remain elevated with risk of further incidents in the coming weeks.
Jihadist violence in West Africa has expanded into coastal states (Benin, Nigeria, Togo) and intensified in the Sahel core, with JNIM doubling attacks in Burkina Faso and killing Mali's defence minister in April 2026. The Alliance of Sahel States has not improved security coordination, and the humanitarian situation is deteriorating with at least 30,000 migrants stranded.
The Venezuelan government is very likely overwhelmed by the humanitarian consequences of the 24 June earthquakes, with confirmed fatalities exceeding 3,500 and evidence contradicting official claims about body identification procedures. No credible evidence supports continued assertions about Nicolás Maduro's custody status, representing a significant shift from prior assessments.
French forces completed their withdrawal from Mali on 15 August 2022, ending Operation Barkhane. This removal of critical counterterrorism support has eliminated a key factor that previously prevented Malian state collapse and jihadist seizure of power. The al-Qaeda-affiliated GSIM coalition remains active in northern and central Mali with no military victory achieved by either side despite thousands of conflict-related deaths.
Jihadist factions in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are likely escalating attacks, including drone use, against airfields, bases and urban targets. Ruling juntas are entrenching security-first responses as humanitarian access erodes, raising the risk of further complex strikes over the next 1-3 months.
Strikes continued in Gaza and across southern Lebanon despite ceasefire claims, while OHCHR warned conduct in Lebanon could amount to international crimes. Maritime operators are adjusting routes around Bab el-Mandeb and through Hormuz amid Houthi threats and wider regional tensions, and a reported Gaza deal remains unconfirmed by Israel.
Taiwan will run August Urban Resilience drills that can halt traffic, order sheltering, disrupt mobile data and impose fines, while Chinese near-shore live-fire training near Dongshan Island is presented as routine and limited. Chinese coast guard patrols east of Taiwan have drawn Taipei’s counter-patrols and condemnation, US-Taiwan coast guard coordination has been acknowledged, and AIS shows vessels are still transiting the Strait.